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A trend setter in Asia up to the sixties, economic management in Pakistan has steadily
deteriorated to the point where the economy has, for the past few decades, lurched
from one financial crisis to the next. At the heart of the problem has been the poor
management of public finances and deep-seated unresolved structural issues in the
economy that bad management and poor governance has exacerbated. The conse-
quences of this secular decline in economic governance are plain to see: macroeco-
nomic instability, high inflation, poor public services, criminal neglect of the social sec-
tors, widespread corruption, crippling power outages, growing unemployment, deep-
ening poverty and a deteriorating debt profile.2
Introduction
Nadeem ul Haque of Pakistan’s Planning Committee has lamented that
the “gyrations of politics and security have kept everyone fully engaged—in
fact, more than fully—and issues of long-term development planning have
been neglected not only by the media but in the public imagination.”3 He
sees this situation as particularly ironic given that the state of the economy
and its advancement are far more likely to affect politics and security than
* Robert E. Looney (PhD) is a distinguished professor at the Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, CA. His latest book, Handbook of Oil Politics will be published by Routledge in
late 2011. He specializes in economic development issues in the Middle East and South Asia
1This study was made possible by a grant from by the Ewing Marion Kauffman
Foundation, Kansas City, Missouri. It is part of a larger study undertaken for the Kauffman
Foundation—“Entrepreneurship and the Process of Development: A Framework for Applied
Expeditionary Economics in Pakistan” (August 2011). A special thanks goes to the
Foundation for its permission to publish this part of the study and to Dane Stangler of the
Kaufman Foundation for his help and encouragement throughout the research phase. 
2Meekal Ahmed, An Economic Crisis State? In Maleeha Lodhi ed., Pakistan: Beyond the
Crisis State (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), p.169
3Qtd. In Adil Najam, Devising A New Growth Strategy for Pakistan (7): New Growth
Framework Approved, All Things Pakistan, May 29, 2011
2vice versa.4 One of a growing number of Pakistani economists who
champions the replacement of the country’s inefficient, state-run policies
with entrepreneur-led growth, ul Haque observes: 
An unintended consequence of our past policies has been the stifling of internal mar-
kets, cities and communities, which play a critical role in fostering productivity, inno-
vation and entrepreneurship and ultimately promote growth, prosperity and develop-
ment. …In the new development framework, the private sector should be the growth-
driver in open market environment that rewards efficiency, innovation and entrepre-
neurship, while the government is facilitator that protects public interests and rights,
provides public goods, enforces laws, punishes exploitative practices, and operates with
transparency and accountability.5
This sentiment lies at the core of the Pakistani Planning Commission’s
New Growth Framework, which was formally adopted by the National
Economic Council in May 2011. The Framework represents a paradigm
shift in Pakistan’s approach towards the economy. It proposes that the
country move from the current state-led model of development to one that
relies on freely-functioning markets with dynamic entrepreneurship
playing the leading role in expanding investment, developing new areas of
economic activity and providing productive employment for the country’s
rapidly burgeoning labor force. While the Framework is intuitively
appealing to professional economists, it is admittedly theoretical at this
point and, as such, has drawn criticism that it offers a list of “what to do,”
as opposed to “how to do.”6 Critics also note that it is vague regarding the
sequencing of its policies and reforms7 and question whether Pakistan’s
government has the ability and political will to implement such an
ambitious agenda.8
The key to implementing the New Growth Framework is the
development of a model that places both on a sound empirical footing. As
previously noted, the New Growth Framework is vague with regard to the
proper sequencing of policies and reforms. To this end sections below
develop an empirical model to serve as a starting point for initiating and
sustaining Pakistan’s New Growth Framework.
4Ibid.
5Nadeem ul Haque, Devising a Growth Strategy for Pakistan (2): Towards a New
Development Approach, All Things Pakistan, February 5, 2011
6Abid Hasan, An Unorthodox Path to Prosperity, The News, July 4, 2011
7Safiya Aftab,The Elusive Quest for Sustainable Growth, The Friday Times, May 6, 2011
8Pervez Tahir, “A ‘New” Growth Strategy,” The Express Tribune, February 11, 2011.
Potential Constraints on Pakistan’s Economic Advancement
and Entrepreneurial Activity
To develop an analytical framework for applying The New Growth
Framework, it is first necessary to identify the constraints with the greatest
potential to impede the country’s progress at each stage of development. In
Pakistan’s case, the list is long. A cursory survey of the literature on suggests
a myriad variety of inhibiting factors. Those most frequently identified as
key development constraints include: (1) lack of competitiveness due to
limitations in factors ranging from infrastructure to education to techno-
logical capacity; (2) limited governance in areas such as rule of law and
anti-corruption, and (3) insufficient economic reforms that hinder open
markets and trade. 
Each of these broad categories is made up of a number of individual
variables, which are explored in depth below. The examination of the
individual variables is instructive; both in illuminating the wide variety of
constraints the Pakistani economy faces and in illustrating the diversity of
opinion as to the paramount factor or factors that inhibit Pakistani growth
and development. 
Potential Competitiveness Constraints
The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitive Index provides an
excellent starting point for examining Pakistan’s inability to sustain long-
term growth. Drawing on the work of Harvard’s Michael Porter,9 the index
provides a benchmark for identifying impediments to a country’s compet-
itiveness.10 The GCI takes into account macroeconomic as well as the core
microeconomic foundations of national competitiveness, which it defines
as “the set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of
productivity and thus income of a country.”11
3
9See for example, Michael Porter, “Enhancing the Microeconomic Foundations of
Prosperity: The Current Competitiveness Index,” in Klaus Schwab ed., The Global
Competitiveness Report 2001-2002 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2001); and Michael
Porter, “The Microeconomic Foundations of Prosperity: Findings from the Business
Competitiveness Index,” in Klaus Schwab ed., The Global Competitiveness Report 2007-
2008 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2007). 
10Xavier Sala-I-Martin et. al., “The Global Competitiveness Index: Measuring the
Productive Potential of Nations,” in Klaus Schwab ed., The Global Competitiveness Report,
2007-2008 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2007), p. 3
11Klaus Schwab, “Preface,” in Klaus Schwab ed., The Global Competitiveness Report
2010-11 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2010), p. 4
4The WEF’s approach depicts global competitiveness as a weighted
average of many different components, each of which affects some aspect
of competitiveness. These components fall into 12 main groups, or “12
pillars of competitiveness.”12 These pillars are: (1) Institutions; (2)
Infrastructure; (3) The Macroeconomic Environment (4) Health and
Primary Education; (5) Higher Education and Training; (6) Goods Market
Efficiency; (7) Labor Market Efficiency; (8) Financial Market
12Ibid.
Table 1
Countries at Various Stages of Development 2010-11
___________________________________________________________________________________
Stage 1 Transition Stage 2 Transition Stage 3
From 1 to 2 From 2 to 3
(Group 1) (Group 2) (Group 3) (Group 4) (Group 5)
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Bangladesh Algeria Albania Bahrain Australia
Benin Angola Argentina Barbados Austria
Bolivia Armenia Bosnia Chile Belgium
Burkina Faso Azerbaijan Brazil Croatia Canada
Burundi Botswana Bulgaria Estonia Cyprus
Cambodia Brunei Cape Verde Hungary Czech Republic
Cameroon Egypt China Latvia Denmark
Chad Georgia Colombia Lithuania Finland
Cote d'Ivoire Guatemala Costa Rica Oman France
Ethiopia Guyana Dominican Republic Poland Germany
Gambia, The Indonesia Ecuador Puerto Rico Greece
Ghana Iran, Islamic Rep El Salvador Slovak Republic Hong Kong SAR
Honduras Jamaica Jordan Taiwan, China Iceland
India Kazakhstan Lebanon Trinidad and Tobago Ireland
Kenya Kuwait Macedonia Uruguay Israel
Kyrgyz Republic Libya Malaysia Italy
Lesotho Morocco Mauritius Japan
Madagascar Paraguay Mexico Korea, Rep
Malawi Qatar Montenegro Luxembourg
Mali Saudi Arabia Namibia Malta
Mauritania Sri Lanka Panama Netherlands
Moldova Swaziland Peru New Zealand
Mongolia Syria Romania Norway
Mozambique Ukraine Russian Federation Portugal
Nepal Venezuela Serbia Singapore
Nicaragua South Africa Slovenia
Nigeria Thailand Spain
Pakistan Tunisia Switzerland











Source: Xavier sala-i-Martin et. al., The Global Competitiveness Index 2010-2011: Looking Beyond the
Economic Crisis, in Klaus Schwab ed., The Global Competitiveness Report: 2010-2011 (Geneva, World Economic
Forum, 2010), p. 11.
Development; (9) Technological Readiness; (10) Market Size: (11) Business
Sophistication; and (11) Innovation. 
Following Porter’s13 earlier work, the WEF further assumes that countries
progress through three distinct stages: (1) factor driven, (2) investment-
driven, and (3) innovation driven. Using regression analysis, the Forum has
found that certain pillars are more important at one stage than at others.
Institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, and health and
primary education are key in the factor-driven stage. Higher education and
training, goods market efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial market
sophistication, technological readiness and market size predominate during
the efficiency-driven stage. Business sophistication and innovation play a
critical role in the innovation-driven stage.
Drawing on this framework, the WEF is able to classify individual
countries into one of these three stages. Each country is assigned to a
development stage based on: (1) its level of GDP per capita measured at
market exchange rates—a proxy for wages (used by the WEF because
internationally comparable data on wages and purchasing power parity
(PPP) are not available for all countries covered); and (2) the extent to
which countries are factor driven, as proxied by the share of exports of
primary goods in total exports. 
The Forum deems countries falling between two stages as “in transition.”
As these countries develop, increasingly more weight is given to the pillars
that will assure their competitiveness when they move on to the next
development stage. In this way, the GFI rewards countries that do what is
needed to ensure a smooth transition and penalizes those that fail to
prepare for the next stage. Table 1 provides a summary of the latest (2010)
World Economic Forum stage classifications. For the purposes of this report
and its empirical model, I have relabeled the WEF stages as Groups 1
through 5, as indicated in parentheses under the main headings on Table 1.
As illustrated in Figure 1, Pakistan’s progress toward improved competi-
tiveness has been limited. According to the WEF’s 2010-11 Global
Competitiveness Report: 
Pakistan falls to 123rd place, weakening across most areas measured by the GCI. Still
at an early stage of development, the country will require efforts in particular to
improve the basic determinants of its competitiveness, namely its institutions (112th),
5
13Michael Porter, “Enhancing the Microeconomic Foundations of Prosperity: The Current
Competitiveness Index,” in Klaus Schwab ed., The Global Competitiveness Report 2001-
2002 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2001).
6infrastructure (110th) and macroeconomic environment 133rd) as well as education at
all levels.14
On this basis, Pakistan falls into Group 1, the initial, factor-driven, stage
of development. 
Figure 1. Pakistan’s Progress in Improved Competitiveness
Source World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011 (Geneva, World
Economic Forum, 2010), p.268
Since the early- to mid-1990s, Pakistan’s competitive shortcomings have
resulted in slowed economic growth relative to other developing countries
in Asia (Figure 2). While the country managed to achieve a short spurt of
growth in the early- to mid-2000s, this expansion was largely consumption
demand driven, rather than the result of a major increase in investment-
led productivity.
Even worse, this period of growth appears to have compounded many of
the problems plaguing Pakistan today. While no detailed studies of income
distribution are available for the last several years of Musharraf’s regime,
Burki estimates that around 10 million Pakistanis benefitted from the
economic growth and restructuring, 25 million would have entered the
system had it not been disrupted, and 45 million were completely
14The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-11 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2010),
p. 30.
ignored.15 Furthermore, he notes that regional inequality emerged from the
Musharraf era, whose benefits were largely confined to the central and
northern Punjab and large cities such as Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi,
Faisalabad and Gujranwala.16
In addition to global competitiveness, the recent literature on failed states
notes that development may be affected by deeper determinants of growth,
including governance variables such as corruption, political stability and
the rule of law.17 Another body of literature observes that the various
dimensions of economic freedom (or the lack thereof) have had a profound
effect on the progress of Pakistan and many other countries.18 Such studies
suggest that, besides the WEF’s 11 competitiveness components, there are
additional factors must be addressed before Pakistan can embark on a path
of sustained growth. 
Figure 2. Per Capita Income in Pakistan and Developing Asia
Source: World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011, p. 266
Limited Institutional Development: Governance
While rating countries on the basis of their relative progress in improving
governance is inherently subjective, the World Bank19 regularly provides a
set of rankings incorporating the full extent of our knowledge about this
phenomenon. The World Bank data set estimates six dimensions of
governance for 213 economies over the period 1996-2009. These
dimensions are: (1) Voice and Accountability; (2) Political Stability and
Absence of Violence; (3) Government Effectiveness; (4) Regulatory
7
15Shahid Javed Burki, “Arithmetic of Discontent,” Dawn December 11, 2007
16Shahid Javed Burki, “Reaching the Disadvantaged,” Dawn, December 18, 2007
17Dani Rodrik and Mark Rosenzweig, Development Policy and Development Economics:
an Introduction in Dani Rodrik and Mark Rosenzweig eds., Handbook of Development
Economics, Volume 5 (Amsterdam: North Holland, 2009).
18See for example J. Gwartney, J. Hall and R. Lawson, Economic Freedom of the World
2000 Annual Report (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 2000).
19World Wide Governance Indicators.
8Quality; (5) Rule of Law; and (6) Control of Corruption. The values for
each of the governance figures range from a low of -2.5 to a high of +2.5,
with a country sample mean of zero. 
The means for the 5-group sample for 2009 (Table 2) show a fairly steady
progression on each governance dimension from low for Group 1 to high
for Group 5. The one notable exception to the pattern is a drop in the Voice
and Accountability dimension as countries move from Group 1 to Group 2.
Pakistan scores low relative to other Group 1 countries on most governance
dimensions: -0.997 on Voice and Accountability vs. a Group 1 average of
–0.547; –2.756 on Political Stability/Absence of Violence vs. –0.685; –0.934
on Government Effectiveness vs. –0.714; –0.925 on Rule of Law vs. –0.761;
and –1.097 on Control of Corruption vs. –0.731. Pakistan surpasses the Group
1 mean only in its Regulatory Quality, on which it scored –0.499 vs. –0.562
for Group 1 countries as a whole. This score not withstanding, poor
governance places severe constraints on Pakistan’s growth. 
These constraints are further exacerbated by Pakistan’s high defense
spending. Looney and McNab found that countries with high levels of
governance and institutional quality, whose defense expenditures make up
a relatively low share of GDP, may experience increased rates of growth if
defense spending is expanded. Conversely, in countries like Pakistan, with
poor institutional quality as proxies by governance indicators such as voice
and accountability, expanding already high levels of defense expenditures
Table 2
Group Means on Governance Dimensions, World Economic Forum Development Stages, 2010-2011
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Voice Political Government Regulatory Rule Control of
Stability Effectiveness Quality of Law Corruption
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1 Mean -0.547 -0.685 -0.714 -0.562 -0.761 -0.731
Number of Countries 38 38 38 37 30 38
Std. Deviation 0.557 0.813 0.389 0.443 0.461 0.388
Pakistan -0.997 -2.756 -0.933 -0.499 -0.925 -0.262
2 Mean -0.739 -0.300 -0.267 -0.278 -0.415 -0.402
Number of Countries 25 25 25 25 22 25
Std. Deviation 0.649 0.787 0.582 0.710 0.552 0.723
3 Mean 0.015 -0.175 0.061 0.137 -0.223 -0.165
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 23 29
Std. Deviation 0.620 0.666 0.412 0.453 0.545 0.442
4 Mean 0.657 0.598 0.802 0.902 0.720 0.572
Number of Countries 15 15 15 15 13 15
Std. Deviation 0.680 0.320 0.303 0.331 0.378 0.456
5 Mean 1.127 0.761 1.462 1.358 1.443 1.488
Number of Countries 32 32 32 32 28 32
Std. Deviation 0.547 0.558 0.430 0.350 0.454 0.661
Total Mean 0.051 -0.038 0.183 0.240 0.109 0.097
Number of Countries 139 139 139 138 116 139
Std. Deviation 0.932 0.882 0.932 0.886 0.989 1.006
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report, 2010-2011 (Geneva: World Economic Forum), 2010
World Economic Forum Stages
has a negative growth impact.20 As a result, without governance reforms,
increased security spending to combat domestic terrorism could hamper
Pakistan’s growth even more severely.
Interestingly, one school of thought contends that Pakistan’s deficient
governance structures may themselves be a major contributing factor to
terrorism and instability. In an early study of terrorism Alan Krueger and
Jitka Maleckova came to the surprising conclusion that a reduction in
poverty in and of itself, or an increase in educational attainment, would not
meaningfully reduce terrorism. Their main finding was that any connection
between poverty, education, and terrorism is indirect, complicated, and
probably quite weak. Instead of viewing terrorism as a direct response to
limited market opportunities or ignorance, they suggest that terrorism is a
response to political conditions and long-standing feelings, either perceived
or real of, indignity and frustration.21 While subsequent studies have refined
this position, Krueger and Maleckova’s findings are still the starting point
in country-by-country assessments of the factors contributing to terrorism.22
Voice and Accountability
In the critical area of Voice and Accountability, Pakistan scores the lowest
of the South Asian countries (Figure 3). Despite steady improvement in the
post-Musharraf years, which saw the country rise from the 11th percential
in 2000 to 21st by 2009, it still lagged below the 2009 Asian average23 of the
36th percentile and India’s 60th percentile.
9
20Robert Looney and Robert McNab, Pakistan’s Economic Security Dilemma: Expanded
Defense Expenditures and the Relative Governance Syndrome, Contemporary South Asia,
March 2007
21Alan Kureger and Jitka Maleckova, Education, Poverty, Political Violence and
Terrorism: Is there a Causal Connection? (Cambridge Mass: National Bureau of Economic
Research, July 2002).
22See also their “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is there a Causal Connection?”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall 2003, pp. 119-144.
23Asian countries included in the World Bank governance data set are: Bangladesh,
Brunei, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea,
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka,
Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam. 
10
Figure 3. Voice and Accountability
Pakistan’s inability to achieve greater voice and accountability no doubt
contributes to the country’s current economic malaise. Shahid Javed
Burki24 contends that, as a result, the political system has not been able to
find a way to reconcile the different economic interests of the country’s
various competing groups. For example, the ruling Pakistan Peoples Party
opposes the levying of taxes on its strong agricultural base, while the
Karachi-based Muttahida Quami Movement argues against taxing urban
services, and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) favors tax protection for
the merchant class. The resulting political stalemate means that no new
forms of direct taxation are available to the country.25
Political Stability/Absence of Violence
Pakistan, like the other South Asian countries, is especially deficient in
political stability/absence of violence (Figure 4). While all four South Asian
countries score considerably below the Asian average (which is not partic-
ularly high by international standards), Pakistan’s score was by far the
worst. From the 16th percentile in 2000, Pakistan experienced a steady
decline on this measure until it eventually leveled off at the first percentile
in 2007. Bangladesh ranked in the 8th percentile and Sri Lanka in the 12th.
24Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan’s New Political Economy, Business Standard, April 22, 2011.
25Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan’s New Political Economy, Business Standard, April 22, 2011.
As might be anticipated, empirical evidence26 suggests that addressing the
country’s political instability is a prerequisite for further economic
advancement. In addition, political instability and policy instability (Figure
5) ranked second and third (after corruption) as major concerns of
businesses—no doubt contributing to the country’s low rates of private
capital formation and inflows of direct private investment. 
Figure 4. Political Stability, Absence of Violence.
Figure 5. Pakistan: The Most Problematic Factors for Doing Business
11
26Muhammad Nadeem Qureshi, Karamat Ali and Imran Rafi Khan, Political Instability
and Economic Development: Pakistan Time-Series Analysis, International Research Journal
of Finance and Economics, 2010
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Figure 6. Government Effectiveness
Source: World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011, p. 266
Government Effectiveness
As shown in Figure 6, Pakistan also scores low in government
effectiveness, a key measure of the ability of countries to carry out
development programs and effectively implement budgets. After averaging
in the high 30s from 2003-2007, the country had fallen to the 19th
percentile by 2009, considerably below the Asian average of 51st and
India’s 54th percentile. 
Economist Safiya Aftab notes some of the economic shortcomings that
have stemmed from the lack of government effectiveness and decision-
making in recent years:
• There is no energy plan (not even a conservation strategy) and little
attempt to resolve the circular debt issue that plagues the sector.
Worst of all, there seems to be no planning for crises—what happens
if crude oil prices spike in the short run, for example?
• Agricultural policy is supposed to be a provincial subject but the
federal government doesn’t seem to have even a guiding framework
for the sector. It’s not clear what the priorities are—is the priority to
get the support price right or to invest in storage for instance? Is the
attempt to deregulate agricultural markets and set up commodity
exchanges going to go anywhere, or has it been quietly shelved?
• There is no attempt to introduce new forms of direct taxation. If there
is any background work on the pros and cons of imposing
agricultural income tax, or different forms of capital gains taxes, it has
not been made public.
• Cuts in expenditure have been occasioned after the floods, but it is
mainly development spending that has been axed not non-salary
current expenditure.
• Cutting the Public Sector Development Projects (PSDP) is probably
the right way to go, but the government needs to be more transparent
about what it’s going to axe and why.
• In spite of the obvious fiscal crisis there has been little attempt to
restructure loss-making state owned enterprises. The government has
given in to pressure on at least two occasions when such attempts
were made in Karachi Electric Supply Company (KESC), though the
government has a minority share in the utility and Pakistan
International Airlines (PIA). For the KESC, the government’s action
was unpardonable. Imposing on a private entity in order to re-
employ staff on the basis of a 26% shareholding is absurd.27
The precipitous drop in government effectiveness in recent years has led
Stephen Cohen to conclude that the bureaucracy and other state structures
are largely incapacitated and unable to respond to the country’s
demographic and economic challenges. As a result, the country’s effective
governance and ultimate viability now depend on a combination of
massive foreign assistance and remittances of overseas Pakistanis.28 Pointing
to Pakistan’s inclusion in the Top 10 of the Failed State Index, he predicts
that the consequences will be “disastrous for future stability and
governance, translating into a chronic incapacity to integrate security,
political, economic and administrative requirements in a central and long-
term decision-making process.”29
Regulatory Quality
Pakistan’s performance (Figure 7) in improving regulatory quality has
been somewhat better than its efforts in other governance areas. Starting
from a low of the 18th percentile in 2004, the country had increased its
score to the 33rd percentile by 2009 (albeit down from 39th in 2006). This
13
27Safiya Aftab, Democracy, Three Years Later, The Friday Times, April 1, 2011
28Stephen Cohen, Keeping Pakistan from Falling Apart, World Politics Review, May
2011, p. 1.
29Stephen Cohen, Keeping Pakistan from Falling Apart, World Politics Review, May
2011, p. 1.
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score was still somewhat below the Asian average of the 50th and India’s
44th percentiles. 
Burki notes that, even though Pakistan has done relatively well in
improving regulatory quality in recent years, Pakistan’s regulatory system
remains seriously underdeveloped for a country of its size. He argues that
this situation stems from the fact that regulation in Pakistan has evolved
more in response to special interests rather than to citizen needs and
demands. While this pattern may change with the devolution of authority
to the provinces, Burki cautions that the weaknesses in the existing
regulatory system could complicate efforts to distinguish between functions
that can only be performed at the federal level and those that can be more
efficiently handled locally.30
Nadeem ul Haq cites regulatory quality as key to improving Pakistan’s
productivity. Ul Haq notes that state enterprises like PIA, Pakistan
Railways and power sector organizations could improve productivity
significantly, and hence contribute to national economic growth, through
regulatory reforms.31
Figure 7. Regulatory Quality.
Rule of Law
30Javed Burki, Devolution and Regulatory Changes, Dawn, April 25, 2011
31Nadeem-ul-Haq Links High Growth Rate to Economic Reforms, Associated Press of
Pakistan, July 6, 2011
In the critical area of rule of law, Pakistan again falls short of other South
Asian countries (Figure 8). The country ranked in the 31st percentile in
1996, declined to the 20th percentile in 2004, improved slightly to the 22nd
percentile, then dipped to the 19th percentile by 2009. In 2009, the average
for Asian countries as a whole was the 48thpercentile, with India ranking
in the 56th, and Sri Lanka the 53rd. Between 2004 and 2009, Bangladesh
was able to increase its ranking from the 17th to the 28th percentile.
A study by the Asian Society highlights the importance of Pakistan’s
improving its rule of law. The Asia Society’s Study Group concluded that
seven core issues needed to be addressed to ensure a sound future for the
country by 2020. The recommendations included: (1) strengthening
democratic institutions; (2) strengthening the rule of law; (3) improving
human development and social services, especially in health and
education; (4) developing the energy infrastructure; (5) assisting the victims
of the 2010 flood in their recovery; (6) improving internal security; and (7)
advancing the peace process with India.32
Figure 8. Rule of Law 
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32Hassan Abbas, Pakistan 2020: A Vision for Building a Better Future, May 2011
Control of Corruption
Corruption, the final World Bank measurement of governance, has
followed an erratic pattern in Pakistan during the past two decades (Figure
9). Starting in the 7th percentile in 1996, Pakistan gradually improved its
score to the 30th percentile in 2003, declined again to the 14 and 15th
percentiles in 2004 and 2005 respectively, and rose to the 26th percentile
in 2007. Since then the country’s ranking has fallen (2009) to the 13th
percentile, the lowest rank among the South Asian countries. In reference,
the Asian average in 2009 was the 42nd percentile with India slightly
higher at the 47th percentile. Ominously, the perception of corruption in
Pakistan is worsening, with the police, land administration institutions, the
judiciary, education, and local governments regarded as the most corrupt
public-sector institutions.33
As shown in Figure 5, businesses cite corruption as their major concern in
doing business in Pakistan. Furthermore, according to Transparency
International’s 2009 report, corruption prevents the “poor from partici-
pating equally in political decisions, from enjoying equality under the law,
from seeing their needs reflected in policies and budgets and from accessing
public goods and services. …Decisions on food and energy security, natural
resources, technology and investments are often compromised by
corruption—with fatal consequences.”34 Significantly, the government of
Pakistan has barred Transparency International from conducting surveys in
the country for the organization’s next annual report.35
Potential Economic Reform Constraints
In addition to arguments linking poor growth and development, instability,
and even terrorism to governance failures, an equally valid claim can be
made that these processes stem from a poor country record in economic
reforms and associated progress towards economic freedom. Bremer and
Kasarda’s terrorism and economic transitions model suggests that failure to
enact needed economic reforms can result in inefficiencies and a lack of
incentives for entrepreneurship, while preventing more dynamic growth
16
33Heritage House, Index of Economic Freedom, 2011
34Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, Berlin: Transparency
International, 2009.
35Siddiqi Hammad, “No Corruption Survey in Pakistan This Year,” Center for
International Private Enterprise Development Blog, accessed online at
http://www.cipe.org/blog/ p=8649 July 7, 2011.
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patterns. The resulting economic malaise spurs a vicious circle of instability,
low investment, low growth and further wide-spread discontent.36
Figure 9. Control of Corruption
Bremer and Kasarda view transition as occurring in three phases (Figure
10). The first phase typically begins when a low-income country rapidly
begins to industrialize, launching an agrarian-industrial transition and the
complex transformations in urbanization, income growth, and economic
diversification that accompany it. A process similar but not identical to
Rostow’s37 take-off occurs. If growth is sustained for a decade or more, the
country may reach the second transition phase, in which industrial
production per capita can increase as much as threefold, growth in low-
value-added manufacturing is rapid and sustained, and rising incomes lead
to the emergence of a middle class. Assuming this middle phase is
successful, the country will likely reach the advanced phase in 10 to 20
years. Countries that are currently in the advanced phase include Brazil,
Poland, Russia, and Turkey.38
In contrast, Pakistan remains stalled in the first stage of this model, along
with countries like Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. According to Bremer
and Kasarda, these countries are trapped in this stage due to their failure to
adopt choice-based systems encompassing both market-based economic
36Jennifer Bremer and John Kasarda, “The Origins of Terror: Implications for U.S.
Foreign Policy,” Milken Institute Review, Fourth Quarter 2002, pp. 34-48
37Footnote Rostow’s book
38Jennifer Bremer and John Kasarda, op. cit.
reforms and democratic political institutions and organizations. Without
the adoption and proper sequencing of such reforms, they cannot progress
up the ladder to more sophisticated production structures and, as a result,
will face rising popular discontent and instability, along with the threat of
terrorist insurrection.39
Figure 10. Transitions and Institutional Constraints
Source: Robert Looney, Failed Economic Take-Offs and Terrorism in Pakistan, Asian Survey,
November/December 2004, p.787.
Limited Progress in Economic Freedom
No indices of the prevalence of choice-based systems exist. However, the
Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World40 and the Heritage
House/Wall Street Journal's Index of Economic Freedom41 are good
proxies in that they measure the relative progress of countries in moving
toward a deregulated, limited government, free-market environment. The
18
39Ibid.
40James Gwartney, Joshua Hall and Robert Lawson, Economic Freedom of the World
2010 Annual Report (Vancouver, Fraser Institute, 2011),
41Heritage House, Economic Opportunity and Prosperity: The 2011 Index of Economic
Freedom (Washington: Heritage House, 2011).
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Heritage House data set was chosen for this study because it contains a
larger sample of countries. 
To measure economic freedom, the Heritage Index takes ten different
factors into account: (1) trade policy; (2) fiscal burden of government; (3)
government intervention in the economy; (4) monetary policy; (5) banking
and finance; (6) capital flows and foreign investment; (7) wage and prices; (8)
property rights; (9) regulation, and (10) the informal market. These factors
are designed to measure the openness of countries to competition, the degree
of state intervention in the economy, and the ability of the courts to enforce
rules and property rights. Heritage House emphasizes that countries must
score well in all ten of the factors in order to improve their economic
efficiency and, consequently, the living standards of their people.42
In the 2011 Heritage House Index of Economic Freedom, Pakistan’s
score was 55.1, compared highest-ranking Hong Kong at 89.7. Pakistan
ranked 24th of 41 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, with an overall score
that was below both the world and regional averages. While Pakistan’s
aggregate Economic Freedom ranking compared relatively favorably those
of Bangladesh, Sri Lank and India (Figure 11), the country made few gains
in the overall liberalization of the economy, as indicated by the fact that its
score in 2011 was slightly lower than in 1995.43
Figure 11. Overall Economic Freedom Score
42Ibid.
43Ibid.
On the positive side, Pakistan has pursued reforms to improve its
entrepreneurial environment and facilitate private sector development. In
addition, the country made significant gains in recent years in liberalizing
restrictions on trade (Figure 12) although its progress in this area lagged
behind India’s by a wide margin. However, in other areas, Pakistan’s
progress lags considerably. Its tax system is complex and inefficient, though
reforms have been undertaken to cut tax rates, broaden the tax base, and
increase transparency. The judicial system suffers from a serious backlog
and poor security, and corruption taints the both judiciary and civil service.
In addition, restrictions on foreign investment and state involvement in the
economy are serious drags on economic dynamism.44
Figure 12. Trade Freedom
An examination of the group means by World Economic Forum
groupings (Tables 3 and 4) shows a pattern similar to that found in the
governance dimensions: countries show steady progress in economic
reforms as they move from Group 1 to Group 5. The one major exemption
is in the fiscal area, where lower levels of government spending and taxes
are considered freer. Given the expansion of government spending in the
advanced countries, Groups 4 and 5 score low on this dimension.
In contrast with the governance indicators, Pakistan compares slightly
favorably with other Group 1 countries. Overall it scored 55.1 vs. 54.3 for




Freedom 80.5 vs. 77.1, and for Government Spending 88.8 vs. 75.2. It
should be noted, however, that Heritage House considers low government
spending and minimal tax rates as a sign of economic freedom. While
many would agree that this measure makes sense for developed economies,
critics of Pakistan’s economic management contend it is precisely these
attributes that have created the country’s current crisis of growing income
inequality, crumbling infrastructure, and an educational system incapable
of meeting the needs of a modern economy.
On the negative side, Pakistan scores below the Group 1 norm in the
areas of Trade Freedom (67 vs. 69.5 for Group 1 countries), Monetary
Freedom (63.6 vs. 70.0), Investment Freedom (40.0 vs. 41.2), Financial
Freedom (40.0 vs. 43.3), Property Freedom (30.0 vs. 30.2), Freedom From
Corruption (24.0 vs. 27.0) and Labor Freedom (46.3 vs. 57.6).
In sum, the progress made by Pakistan in the critical areas of competi-
tiveness, governance, and economic reform remains disappointing, with
retrogressions occurring in several key areas. Even during periods of rapid
growth, the country was unable to make significant gains. 
If the models of economic stagnation and terrorism developed by Bremer
and Kasarda play out along expected lines, the country’s future is dire. The
situation has been best summed up by long-time Financial Times columnist
Table 3
Group Means on Economic Freedom Dimensions I, World Economic Forum Development Stages, 2010-2011
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Overall Business Trade Fiscal Government Monetary
Freedom Freedom Freedom Freedom Spending Freedom
Score
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1 Mean 54.300 55.460 69.537 77.051 75.168 69.886
Number of Countries 38 38 38 37 37 37
Std. Deviation 5.867 11.605 7.503 9.418 15.816 5.591
Pakistan 55.2 71.7 67.0 80.5 88.8 69.4
2 Mean 57.260 65.150 74.792 82.204 71.667 66.329
Number of Countries 24 24 24 24 24 24
Std. Deviation 9.639 16.136 10.320 11.229 15.905 7.024
3 Mean 61.890 67.110 78.090 80.517 71.893 71.928
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29
Std. Deviation 6.263 9.410 7.970 7.884 16.450 4.942
4 Mean 68.910 72.550 84.136 80.693 63.229 72.879
Number of Countries 14 14 14 14 14 14
Std. Deviation 4.936 9.822 7.166 9.408 17.512 4.184
5 Mean 73.190 85.470 86.391 64.234 49.128 78.613
Number of Countries 32 32 32 32 32 32
Std. Deviation 6.899 10.272 3.562 14.439 19.451 3.810
Total Mean 62.330 68.380 77.696 76.059 66.496 72.055
Number of Countries 137 137 137 138 136 138
Std. Deviation 10.057 15.860 9.818 12.693 19.661 6.649
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Hetitage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom data base, 2010
World Economic Forum Stages
Farhan Bokhari. Observing the country’s ever shifting political alliances
and infighting he notes that such developments:
…only work to reinforce the largely tainted view of Pakistan's prevailing political order,
built to protect and promote the country's vested interests across its urban and rural
belts. Pakistan's survival, prosperity and stability depend fundamentally on the ability
of its ruling class to reform the country on multiple fronts. Without giving a new direc-
tion to Pakistan’s economy backed by reforms surrounding internal management and
governance, the country's outlook will largely remain unchanged.45
If the country is to move ahead, where should the emphasis lie in
developing a reform strategy to overcome the impediments posed by the
country’s governance/institutional structures? The next section addresses
this issue through the development of an empirically based model
structured to identify the nature and sequencing of the most urgent reforms.
Constraints on Pakistan’s Growth Potential and Entrepreneurship
It is unrealistic to expect that the Pakistani government, or any
government for that matter, could address all the potential constraints
identified in the previous section. Hausman, Rodrik and Velasco suggest
that a better approach is to identify and address the one or two most
22
45Farhan Bokhari, “Pakistan Stability Hinges on Reform,” gulfnews.com, April 24, 2011
Table 4
Group Means on Economic Freedom Dimensions II, World Economic Forum Development Stages, 2010-2011
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Investment Financial Property Freedom from Labor 
Freedom Freedom Rights Corruption Freedom
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
1 Mean 41.180 43.290 30.210 27.010 57.600
Number of Countries 38 38 38 37 37
Std. Deviation 14.861 12.318 8.918 6.482 14.868
Pakistan 30 40 30 25 49.8
2 Mean 45.430 43.750 35.220 31.000 60.429
Number of Countries 23 24 23 24 24
Std. Deviation 22.508 16.101 14.498 11.425 19.769
3 Mean 54.310 53.450 40.170 38.140 63.403
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29
Std. Deviation 16.568 12.328 13.462 8.855 12.870
4 Mean 68.570 63.570 62.500 54.500 66.621
Number of Countries 14 14 14 14 14
Std. Deviation 11.673 13.927 13.552 10.559 15.062
5 Mean 75.310 70.630 80.940 74.530 66.678
Number of Countries 32 32 32 32 32
Std. Deviation 12.885 12.165 12.472 14.213 18.589
Total Mean 55.550 53.980 48.440 43.970 62.366
Number of Countries 136 137 136 137 137
Std. Deviation 20.911 17.141 23.577 21.328 16.561
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Hetitage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom data base, 2010
World Economic Forum Stages
binding present constraints. To this end, they propose that each country use
a decision tree methodology (Figure 13) to identify binding constraints and
policy options. Their framework focuses on the short-term, identifying
constraints as they emerge rather than attempting to anticipate future
impediments to growth.46
Figure 13. Growth Constraint Decision Tree
Source: Ricardo Hausmann, Dani Rodrik and Andres Velasco, Getting the Diagnosis Right: Finance
and Development, March 2006
While this approach provides a good starting point, the goal of the
present study is to develop a model that addresses both entrepreneurship
and growth, which are unlikely to face the same constraints simultaneously.
Furthermore, given Pakistan’s history of stalled growth and failed take-offs,
it is crucial to identify the correct sequence of reforms necessary to firmly
set the country on the path to development and keep it there. It is hoped
that the model that emerges can offer direction, not only to Pakistan, but to
broad classes of countries facing similar circumstances.
As the basis for the model, the World Economic Forum Competitiveness
Indicators (WEF), the World Bank Governance Indicators (WB), and the
Heritage House Index of Economic Freedom (EF) were merged into a
single data base.47 Added to this were the World Bank’s data base on
23
46Ricardo Hausman, Dani Rodrick and Andres Velasco, Getting the Diagnosis Right: A
New Approach to Economic Reform” Finance & Development March 2006.
47Preliminary analysis suggested that while the Milken Institute Capital Access data set
provided some interesting insights to the Pakistani situation, because of its relatively narrow
focus it t did not contribute a significant amount of information over and above that pro-
vided by the other three data sets.
entrepreneurial activity48 and the size of the shadow economy (% GDP) in
individual countries.49 The shadow economy is relatively large in Pakistan,
averaging around 37.1 percent of GDP.50 It is included in part to track the
country’s movement towards an efficient competitive economy, since the
literature on entrepreneurship and growth stresses the necessity of
transforming informal/shadow activities into formal entities with higher
productivity and tax-paying potential.51
Discriminant Analysis—Key Constraints on Group Advancement
The WEF uses two criteria for allocating countries into five stages of
development. The first is the level of GDP per capita at market exchange
rates as a proxy for wages, since comparable data on wages are not available
for all countries. The second is the extent to which countries are factor
driven, as proxies by the share of minerals in total exports. For example,
countries in which minerals make up 70 percent or more of average total
exports over a five-year period are deemed to be factor-driven.52
The inability of Pakistan and many other countries to sustain steady growth
raises the more interesting question of whether there are specific
impediments that might cause a country to get “stuck” in one of these groups.
Rather than per capita income and primary product exports, are there
specific governance/competitiveness/economic freedom variables associated
with each pair of country groupings that constrain or delay the development
process until threshold levels are reached? While not conclusive proof of
causation, if the hypothesis derived from the factor analysis is correct, we
should expect to find that entrepreneurship is a leading force in affecting
either directly or indirectly these key transition variables.
24
48World Bank, Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES), 2010 which comprises the number of
newly registered limited liability companies per 1,000 working-age people (those ages 15-64).
49Data compiled in Friedrich Schneider and Andreas Buehn, Shadow Economics and
Corruption All Over the World: Revised Estimates for 120 Countries, Economics: the Open
Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, October 27, 2009 
50Data compiled in Friedrich Schneider and Andreas Buehn, Shadow Economics and
Corruption All Over the World: Revised Estimates for 120 Countries, Economics: the Open
Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, October 27, 2009 
51Friedrich Schneider with Domninik Enste, Hiding in the Shadows: The Growth of the
Underground Economy (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 2002).
52World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011 (Geneva,
World Economic Forum, 2010), p. 10
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To test this theory, a discriminant analysis53 was undertaken to determine
which variables were statistically significant in correctly classifying
countries in each of the five WEF stages of development. The discriminate
results start with Groups 1 and 2, with group membership gradually
expanded to see which variables come into play when more developed
countries are added to the sample.
53Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, Performance Criteria for Evaluating Economic
Development Potential: An Operational Approach, Quarterly Journal of Economics, May
1968. See Also Randal Jones, A Model For Predicting Expropriation in Latin America
Applied to Jamaica, Colombia Journal of World Business, Spring 1980 for an early example
of the use of factor and discriminant analysis in classifying countries and assessing the




Groups 1 and 2 (82.5% Placement as WEF) Pakistan 90.4% in WEF Group 1
Mean Values Discriminant Groups
_________________________
Discriminating Variables in Order of Importance Group 1 Group 2  Pakistan
WEF Innovation 2.79 2.96 3.03
WEF Infrastructure 2.53 3.72 2.75
Pakistan
Groups 1, 2 and 3 (75.0% Placement as WEF) Pakistan 89.4% in WEF Group 1
Mean Values Discriminant Groups
_________________________
Discriminating Variables in Order of Importance Group 1 Group 2  Group 3 Pakistan
WEF Technological Readiness 2.77 3.27 3.67 2.94
WEF Innovation 2.80 2.95 3.05 3.03
WEF Infrastructure 2.52 3.66 3.80 2.75
WB Voice and Accountability -0.49 -0.95 0.16 -1.00
Groups 1, 2, 3 and 4 (72.9% Placement as WEF) Pakistan 94.1% in WEF Group 1
____________________________________
Discriminating Variables in Order of Importance Group 1 Group 2  Group 3 Group 4 Pakistan
WEF Technological Readiness 2.78 3.29 3.67 4.38 2.94
WEF Innovation 2.79 2.95 3.13 3.36 3.03
WEF Infrastructure 2.50 3.71 3.80 4.64 2.75
WEF Growth Potential 3.47 4.07 4.19 4.36 3.48
WB Voice and Accountability -0.53 -0.93 0.22 0.72 -1.00
Groups 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 Pakistan 97.0% in WEF Group 1
(75.0% Placement as WEF)
____________________________________________
Discriminating Variables in Order of Importance Group1 Group 2  Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Pakistan
WEF Innovation 2.77 2.99 3.05 3.31 4.68 3.03
WEF Higher Education and Training 2.85 3.81 4.11 4.7 5.41 2.91
WEF Infrastructure 2.46 3.62 3.77 4.63 5.61 2.75
EF Monetary Freedom 70.67 65.03 72.66 73.67 79.14 69.4
WEF Growth Potential 3.44 4.06 4.12 4.36 5.09 3.48
WB Rule of Law -0.77 -0.46 -0.21 0.72 1.53 -0.93
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: SPSS 19.0 Stepwise Multiple Discriminant Analysis. WEF = World Economic Forum Competitiveness data.
EF = Heritage House Economic Freedom data set; WB = World Bank governance data set
Mean Values Discriminant Groups
Mean Values Discriminant Groups
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Of the 28 possible profiling elements (Table 5), only two were statistically
significant in separating Group 1 and 2 countries into distinct groupings
based on competitiveness/governance and economic freedom. In order of
importance, these were the WEF’s innovation variable and the WEF’s
infrastructure variable, which together correctly classified 82.5% of
countries into their original WEF groupings. In the case of both variables,
Group 2 countries had a significantly higher level of attainment, especially
with regard to infrastructure. Pakistan was classified as a Group 1 country
with a 90.4% probability. It scored higher than even Group 2 countries in
innovation but, although above the Group 1 mean, was considerably
underdeveloped in infrastructure. These results indicate that infrastructure
must be developed before Pakistan can move to the next stage.
Broadening the discriminant analysis to include Group 3 countries
produced another distinct profiling pattern. Four variables were statistically
significant in profiling the combined group of countries into their three
original WEF groupings with 75.0 percent accuracy. In declining order of
statistical importance, these variables were: the WEF’s measure of techno-
logical readiness, the WEF’s innovation, the WEF’s infrastructure, and
finally, the World Bank’s measure of governance, voice and accountability.
Pakistan was again classified as a Group 1 country with 89.4%
confidence. As in the previous analysis, it matches up well in terms of
innovation, with a score in the range of the Group 3 mean. Whether the
country will be able to overcompensate in this area sufficiently to move up
the development ladder is problematic, given that it currently scores only
slightly better than the mean for Group 1 not only in infrastructure, but in
technological readiness. 
In contrast to the other key transition variables which show steady
progress as countries move to higher groupings, the mean group scores for
voice and accountability decline for Group 2 countries before increasing
dramatically for Group 3. This finding suggests that authoritarian regimes
may be more adept at initiating a growth process, and, in fact, Pakistan’s
economic performance has been somewhat better under military rule. On
the other hand, reliance on the military has not resulted in sustained
growth. Instead, it appears that economic reforms, like the ones undertaken
by Musharraf in the early and mid-2000s, simply give rise to a new set of
rent-seekers intent on maintaining the status quo.54 Pakistan’s democratic
institutions and government accountability must be immediately
54Shahid Javed Burki, Changing Perceptions, Altered Reality: Pakistan’s Economy Under
Musharraf, 1999-2006 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), Chapter 1.
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strengthened to sustain its progress from Group 1 to Group 2, with
governance reforms continuing to facilitate the transition to Group 3. 
When the discriminant sample is further expanded to include countries
in Group 4, the WEF’s overall growth potential variable contributes to
group delineation. 72.9% of the countries are correctly classified in their
respective WEF groupings, with Pakistan having a 94.1% probability of
remaining in Group 1. 
Pakistan’s score on the WEF’s growth potential term is very slightly
above the Group 1 norm. The growth potential term increases steadily
from the lower to the higher country groupings, suggesting that a balanced
attainment of many of the competitiveness measures is critical for
continued advancement. 
Finally, when the discriminant analysis included all five groups, six key
variables were identified that create a distinct competitiveness/
governance/economic freedom environment. In addition to innovation,
infrastructure and growth potential, the WEF’s higher education and
training, the World Banks rule of law and the Heritage House’s monetary
freedom are statistically significant in correctly classifying 75% of the
countries in their original WEF groupings. Pakistan is classified with a 97%
probability as belonging in Group 1.
Regression Analysis—Key Linkages Surrounding Entrepreneurship
The discriminant analysis was suggestive of the potentially key role
entrepreneurship could play in Pakistan’s transition to higher levels of
development. Still left unanswered however are the relationships between
entrepreneurship and other key competitiveness/governance/economic
freedom variables. To fill this gap, a regression analysis was performed on
the country sample to determine the specific factors that contribute to
entrepreneurship. 
Factors Contributing to Increased Entrepreneurship
Neoliberal thought holds that economic liberalization and increased
efforts in many of the WEF’s categories of competitiveness can produce an
environment conducive to the creation of new small and medium sized
enterprises (SME).55 This assumption underlay the neo-liberal approach to
economic reform in Chile after the fall of Allende and later became the
rationale for many of the dramatic market reforms in post-communist
55Robert Looney, Neo-liberalism in R.J. Barry Jones, Routledge Encyclopedia of
International Political Economy (London: Routledge, 2001) Volume 2, pp.1106-1110.
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Eastern and Central Europe.56 To test this proposition, the World Bank’s
entrepreneurship (density) was regressed on the WEF’s competitiveness
data set and the Heritage House economic freedom variables. As with the
discriminant analysis, the analysis began with Groups 1 and 2 and
gradually expanded to the more developed country groupings.57
Of the competitiveness and economic freedom variables, entrepre-
neurship in Group 1 and 2 countries responded most strongly to improved
trade freedom, followed by business freedom (Table 6). These two variables
alone accounted for over 50% of the fluctuation in entrepreneurship for this
sample of countries. 
56Ibid.
57The results presented here are for countries classified in groups derived from the dis-
criminant analysis. However a separate analysis of the WEF groupings produced a similar
set of findings.
Table 6
Determinants of Entrepreneurial Activity
(Stepwise Regression)
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Standardized t Sig df R R Square Adjusted
Coefficient R Square
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
WEF Group 1 
Model 1
EF Trade Freedom 0.584 3.447 0.002 23 0.584 0.341 0.312
Model 2
EF Trade Freedom 0.565 4.114 0.000
EF Business Freedom 0.495 3.598 0.002 22 0.765 0.585 0.547
WEF Groups 1 and 2
 
Model 1
WEF Technological Readiness 0.503 3.775 0.000 42 0.503 0.253 0.236
Model 2
WEF Technological Readiness 0.547 4.330 0.000
EF Fiscal Freedom 0.326 2.583 0.013 41 0.598 0.358 0.327
Model 3
WEF Technological Readiness 0.540 4.451 0.000
EF Fiscal Freedom 0.266 2.131 0.039
WEF Labor Market Efficiency 0.260 2.101 0.042 40 0.649 0.422 0.378
Model 4
WEF Technological Readiness 0.381 2.762 0.009
EF Fiscal Freedom 0.254 2.119 0.041
WEF Labor Market Efficiency 0.273 2.301 0.027
EF Freedom From Corruption 0.292 2.132 0.039 39 0.734 0.482 0.429
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: Stepwise Regression Model: IBM SPSS 19.0; Country groupings are those from the World Economic Forum Competitiveness 
2010-2011 data set. Data Set: WEF = World Economic Forum Dompetitiveness data set;, EF = Heritage Economic Freedom Data Set; 
Entrepreneurship data: World Bank Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES) 2010.
Regression Analysis was entrepreneurship on the combined WEF and EF data sets.
Additional Variables: SHADOW = Size of the Shadow Economy (% GDP), WEFGROUP,  group prediction dummy 
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When the sample was expanded to include Group 3, competitiveness
factors, especially technological readiness and labor market efficiency, took
on an added role in facilitating increased entrepreneurial activity. Increased
freedom from corruption was also a critical factor at this juncture. 
With the addition of Group 4, economic freedom factors were replaced
by variables reflecting increased competitiveness, namely, technological
readiness and labor market efficiency (Table 7). The fact that the economic
liberalization reforms impact primarily at early stages of development was
confirmed through regressions omitting Group 1 countries. For Groups 2,
3, and 4 and for 3 and 4 separately, only competitiveness variables—techno-
logical readiness and labor market efficiency—were statistically significant
in affecting entrepreneurship. 
With market liberalization, especially trade freedom and business
freedom reforms, opportunities for increased entrepreneurial activity open
up for Group 1 countries like Pakistan. Further increases in market reforms
do not appear as critical in influencing movement through the higher stages
of development, although a key market reform may still make a significant
contribution to the growth of new firms.
Table 7
Determinants of Entrepreneurial Activity (contd.)
(Stepwise Regression)
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Standardized t Sig df R R Square Adjusted
Coefficient R Square
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
WEF Groups 1, 2, 3 and 4
Model 1
WEF Technological readiness 0.616 5.585 0.000 51 0.616 0.380 0.367
Model 2
WEF Technological Readiness 0.563 5.260 0.000
WEF Labor Market Efficiency 0.269 2.508 0.015 50 0.670 0.449 0.427
WEF Groups 2, 3 and 4
 
Model 1
WEF Technological Readiness 0.529 3.373 0.001 36 0.529 0.280 0.260
Model 2
WEF Technological Readiness 0.383 2.703 0.011
WEF Labor Market Efficiency 0.378 2.663 0.012 35 0.633 0.401 0.367
WEF Groups  3 and 4
 
Model 1
WEF Labor Market Efficiency 0.536 3.237 0.003 26 0.536 0.287 0.260
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: Stepwise Regression Model: IBM SPSS 19.0; Country groupings are those from the World Economic Forum Competitiveness 
2010-2011 data set. Data Set: WEF = World Economic Forum Dompetitiveness data set;, EF = Heritage Economic Freedom Data Set; 
Entrepreneurship data: World Bank Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES) 2010.
Regression Analysis was entrepreneurship on the combined WEF and EF data sets.
Additional Variables: SHADOW = Size of the Shadow Economy (% GDP), WEFGROUP,  group prediction dummy 
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However, while market reform can produce increased entrepreneurial
activity, it is not sufficient in and of itself sufficient to create a virtuous circle
of continued growth and reform. This fact is illustrated by the vicious circle
in which Pakistan now finds itself, despite the market reforms undertaken
by Musharraf in the, as well as by the experiences of several of the former
European Communist countries. 
Entrepreneurship and Governance
The literature suggests that the impact of entrepreneurship on
governance may play a major role in determining whether initial growth
will be devolve into a vicious or evolve into a virtuous circle of
development.58 According to Havrylyshyn and Wolf,59 a vicious circle is
precipitated when the first set of entrepreneurs and other vested interests,
content merely to live off their rents, derail the development process by
blocking further governance (and possibly economic) reforms. In contrast,
the creation of a virtuous circle requires entrepreneurs to take a longer term
view and push for continuing reforms to spur additional growth and
increase profits.60
The analysis thus far appears to support this theory. The components of
governance, with the exception of voice and accountability, show steady
improvement as countries move to higher and higher groupings. The level
of improvement for both the WEF groups and the discriminant groupings
used in this model appears to peak as countries move from Group 3 to
Group 4 (Table 8). Control of corruption also improves markedly at this
level, but reaches its maximum rate of improvement during the transition
from Group 4 to Group 5. 
Are these patterns, in fact, associated with pressure from entrepreneurial
groups for further reforms, especially in the area of governance? After
controlling for what appears to be a normal improvement in governance as
countries develop, does increased governance contribute an additional
amount to the upgrading of national governance dimensions? If a pattern
exists, it may to do so with a lag due to the time it takes to realize major
changes in areas like the rule of law or control of corruption. Thus, we
58From somewhat different perspectives, this theme is touched upon in William Baumol,
Robert Litan and Carl Schramm, Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism and the Economics of
Growth and Prosperity (New Have: Yale University Press, 2007) and Raghuram Rajan,
Saving Capitalism from The Capitalists (New York: Crown Business, 2003)
59Oleh Havrylyshyn and Thomas Wolf, Determinants of Growth in Transition Countries,
Finance & Development, June 1999
60Ibid.
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would expect major gains in governance to follow somewhat behind
flurries of increased entrepreneurial activity.
Regression analysis was used to identify possible linkages between
improved levels of governance and entrepreneurship. Because there
appears to be a normal progression of regression improvement by group
(again with Voice and Accountability the exception), a control stage
dummy variable was included as an independent variable—assuming values
of 1, 2, 3 4, 5 to reflect the various country groupings. For the regressions
involving the WEF stages, these values replicate the country groupings. In
Table 8
Governance Patterns by Country Grouping
(group means)
___________________________________________________________________________________
WEF Country Group Voice and Political GovernmenRegulatory Rule of Control of
Accounrtabili Stability Effectivenes Quality Law Corruption
___________________________________________________________________________________
Group 1 -0.547 -0.685 -0.714 -0.562 -0.760 -0.732
Group 2 -0.739 -0.300 -0.267 -0.278 -0.394 -0.403
Difference: Group 2 - Group 1 -0.192 0.385 0.447 0.284 0.366 0.329
Group 3 0.015 -0.176 0.016 0.137 -0.178 -0.165
Difference: Group 3 - Group 2 0.754 0.124 0.283 0.415 0.216 0.238
Group 4 0.657 0.598 0.802 0.902 0.715 0.572
Difference: Group 4 - Group 3 0.642 0.774 0.786 0.765 0.893 0.737
Group 5 1.127 0.761 1.462 1.358 1.436 1.488
Difference: Group 5 - Group 4 0.470 0.163 0.660 0.456 0.721 0.916
____________________________________________________________________________________
Discriminant Country Voice and Political GovernmenRegulatory Rule of Control of
Group Accounrtabili Stability Effectivenes Quality Law Corruption
____________________________________________________________________________________
Group 1 -0.535 -0.694 -0.751 -0.569 -0.774 -0.737
Group 2 -0.638 -0.279 -0.340 -0.374 -0.455 -0.481
Difference: Group 2 - Group 1 -0.103 0.415 0.411 0.195 0.319 0.256
Group 3 -0.083 -0.299 0.008 0.165 -0.215 -0.201
Difference: Group 3 - Group 2 0.555 -0.020 0.348 0.539 0.240 0.280
Group 4 0.650 0.577 0.789 0.889 0.719 0.557
Difference: Group 4 - Group 3 0.733 0.876 0.781 0.724 0.934 0.758
Group 5 1.200 0.769 1.561 1.419 1.530 1.629
Difference: Group 5 - Group 4 0.550 0.192 0.772 0.530 0.811 1.072
____________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: Data from World Bank Governance Indicators data set for 2009
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a similar fashion, for the analysis of the progression of governance
improvement through the discriminant stages, the dummy assumed the
value of each of the assigned groupings. 
For the WEF Groups 1 and 2 (Table 9), there are very weak linkages
between entrepreneurship and increased levels of governance, with slight
improvements occurring in the areas of political stability and regulatory
quality. For the other measures of governance, no statistically significant
linkages were found.
Table 9
Entrepreneurship and Improved Governance: WEF Country Groupings
____________________________________________________________________________________________
Governance Measures Standardized t Sig R Square
Coefficient adjusted
____________________________________________________________________________________________
WEF Country Groups 1 and 2
Voice and Accountability No Variables Statistically Significant
Political Stability
Entrepreneurship 0.376 2.184 0.031 0.141
Government Effectiveness
WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.418 2.475 0.019 0.146
Regulatory Quality
Entrepreneurship 0.444 2.619 0.014 0.168
Rule of Law No Variables Statistically Significant
Control of Corruption No Variables Statistically Significant
WEF Country Groups 2 and 3
Voice and Accountability
WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.376 2.504 0.017
Entrepreneurship 0.331 2.208 0.034 0.288
Political Stability
Entrepreneurship 0.500 3.368 0.002 0.228
Government Effectiveness
WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.408 2.608 0.013 0.142
Regulatory Quality
Entrepreneurship 0.478 3.171 0.003 0.205
Rule of Law
Entrepreneurship 0.476 3.160 0.003 0.204
Control of Corruption
Entrepreneurship 0.402 2.855 0.007
WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.387 2.746 0.100 0.373
____________________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Stepwise Regression --  Dependent Variables Listed in order of Entry. Data: Governance measures
World Bank Governance Indicators; Entrepreneurship: World Bank, Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES), 2020
All data is for 2009.
33
The picture improves somewhat for countries in Groups 2 and 3. For
these countries expanded entrepreneurship results in improved
governance, with the exception of government effectiveness. However, as
indicated by the adjusted r2 term, these linkages are not particularly strong. 
Entrepreneurial linkages improve dramatically for countries in WEF
Groups 3 and 4 (Table 10). Again, entrepreneurship is statistically
significant for all categories of governance, with the exception of
government effectiveness. More importantly, in contrast to the previous
groupings, the adjusted r2 values move into the 40 and 50% range, with the
exception of voice and accountability. That is, entrepreneurship accounts
for nearly half the observed fluctuations in governance after controlling for
the normal patterns of improvement.
Table 10
Entrepreneurship and Improved Governance: WEF Country Groupings (contd.)
_______________________________________________________________________________________
Governance Measures Standardized t Sig R Square
Coefficient adjusted
_______________________________________________________________________________________
WEF Country Groups 3 and 4
Voice and Accountability
WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.398 2.690 0.011
Entrepreneurship 0.363 2.450 0.020 0.306
Political Stability
WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.563 4.179 0.000
Entrepreneurship 0.282 2.096 0.440 0.425
Government Effectiveness
WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.702 5.580 0.000 0.477
Regulatory Quality
WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.616 5.186 0.000
Entrepreneurship 0.341 2.870 0.007 0.553
Rule of Law
WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.654 5.694 0.000
Entrepreneurship 0.312 2.716 -0.011 0.582
Control of Corruption
WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.593 4.592 0.000
Entrepreneurship 0.290 2.246 0.032 0.472
_______________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Stepwise Regression --  Dependent Variables Listed in order of Entry. Data: Governance measures
World Bank Governance Indicators; Entrepreneurship: World Bank, Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES), 2020
All data is for 2009.
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Finally, countries in Groups 4 and 5 (Table 11) show few linkages
between improved levels of governance and increased entrepreneurial
activity. Entrepreneurship is statistically significant only in the case of
regulatory quality, and even here it is a secondary factor after taking into
account the progression of stages. 
A slightly different pattern emerges when countries are examined in the
discriminant analysis framework. Again, there are few linkages for Groups
1 and 2 (Table 12) outside political stability and regulatory quality between
expanded entrepreneurship and higher levels of governance. The linkages
that do occur are extremely weak and barely significant. 
Linkages strengthen somewhat, especially in the area of voice and
accountability, once countries reach Groups 2 and 3. Here entrepre-
neurship, along with the stage progression term, account for over 60% of
the variance across countries in voice and accountability. More
importantly, for countries in these groups, entrepreneurship has a statis-
tically significant link to all governance measures.
Table 11
Entrepreneurship and Improved Governance: WEF Country Groupings (contd.)
____________________________________________________________________________________
Governance Measures Standardized t Sig R Square
Coefficient adjusted
____________________________________________________________________________________
WEF Country Groups 4 and 5
Voice and Accountability
WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.395 2.652 0.012 0.156
Political Stability No Variables Statistically Significant
Government Effectiveness
WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.610 4.743 0.000 0.355
Regulatory Quality
WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.418 2.998 0.005 0.284
Entrepreneurship 0.296 2.124 0.040
Rule of Law
WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.621 4.882 0.000 0.369
Control of Corruption
WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.545 4.008 0.000 0.279
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Stepwise Regression --  Dependent Variables Listed in order of Entry. Data: Governance measures
World Bank Governance Indicators; Entrepreneurship: World Bank, Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES), 2020
All data is for 2009.
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In sharp contrast to the findings reported above for the WEF stages,
countries in discriminant groups 3 and 4 show no statistically significant
linkages with entrepreneurship (Table 13). In all cases, the discriminant
stage dummy has high levels of statistical significance for all measures other
than voice and accountability.
Table 12
Entrepreneurship and Improved Governance: Discriminant Analysis Country Groupings
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Governance Measures Standardized t Sig R Square
Coefficient adjusted
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Discriminant Analysis Country Groups 1 and 2
Voice and Accountability No Variables Statistically Significant
Political Stability
Entrepreneurship 0.376 2.184 0.037 0.141
Government Effectiveness No Variables Statistically Significant
Regulatory Quality
Entrepreneurship 0.444 2.619 0.014 0.168
Rule of Law No Variables Statistically Significant
Control of Corruption No Variables Statistically Significant
Discriminant Analysis Country Groups 2 and 3
Voice and Accountability
Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.679 6.326 0.000
Entrepreneurship 0.294 2.741 0.010 0.617
Political Stability
Entrepreneurship 0.500 3.368 0.002 0.228
Government Effectiveness
Entrepreneurship 0.361 2.256 0.031 0.105
Regulatory Quality
Entrepreneurship 0.407 2.761 0.009
Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.313 2.128 0.041 0.280
Rule of Law
Entrepreneurship 0.476 3.160 0.003 0.204
Control of Corruption
Entrepreneurship 0.456 3.178 0.003
Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.293 2.043 0.049 0.316
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Stepwise Regression --  Dependent Variables Listed in order of Entry. Data: Governance measures
World Bank Governance Indicators; Entrepreneurship: World Bank, Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES), 2020
All data is for 2009.
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Another sharp contrast occurs between the two country grouping systems
for Groups 4 and 5. As noted, there was only a weak linkage between
entrepreneurship and regulatory quality for countries in WEF Groups 4
and 5. In the discriminant country scheme (Table 14), entrepreneurship
forms a highly significant link to four areas of governance: government
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption.
What might account for these differences between country grouping
schemes? As with governance (Table 8), entrepreneurial activity increases as
countries move through the sequence of groupings (Table 15). However,
increases in entrepreneurship between stages vary somewhat by grouping
scheme. For the WEF classification framework, the highest percent increase
in entrepreneurship occurs between Groups 2 and 3, with a marked fall-off
in entrepreneurial activity between Groups 3 and 4. In the case of the
discriminant country scheme, a big jump in entrepreneurial activity occurs
between groups 1 and 2. In contrast with the WEF scheme, there is also a
relatively large increase in entrepreneurship between Groups 3 and 4.
If we assume some delay between surges in entrepreneurship and
improvements in governance, these different patterns of entrepreneurial
expansion are roughly in line with the observed contrasts in governance
Table 13
Entrepreneurship and Improved Governance: Discriminant Analysis Country Groupings (contd.)
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Governance Measures Standardized t Sig R Square
Coefficient adjusted
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Discriminant Country Groups 3 and 4
Voice and Accountability
Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.560 3.823 0.001 0.292
Political Stability
Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.689 5.378 0.000 0.458
Government Effectiveness
Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.877 10.337 0.000 0.762
Regulatory Quality
Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.796 7.435 0.000 0.622
Rule of Law
Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.893 11.222 0.000 0.791
Control of Corruption
Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.812 7.868 0.000 0.649
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Stepwise Regression --  Dependent Variables Listed in order of Entry. Data: Governance measures
World Bank Governance Indicators; Entrepreneurship: World Bank, Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES), 2020
All data is for 2009.
between the two classification schemes. In the case of the WEF countries,
the pattern is fairly straightforward: the big gains in governance observed
in Groups 3 and 4 follow the maximum rate of growth in entrepreneurship
that occurs between Groups 2 and 3. Because of the big drop-off in
entrepreneurial expansion when countries reach Groups 3 and 4, entrepre-
neurship ceases to play a significant role in governance change in Group 4
and 5 countries. 
The same general lagged pattern occurs for the discriminant country
groupings, albeit not quite as sharply. For these countries the largest rate of
increase in entrepreneurship occurs between Groups 1 and 2. These
increases are followed by improved governance in Groups 2 and 3,
especially in voice and accountability where entrepreneurship and the group
dummy accounted for over 60% of the observed variance across countries.
While there is a slight drop-off in the rate of growth of entrepreneurial
activity from Group 2 to 3 and 3 to 4, it is not nearly as dramatic as the
decline from Group 3 to Group 4 in the WEF scheme. As a result, entrepre-
neurship continues to play a significant role in improving governance for
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Table 14
Entrepreneurship and Improved Governance: Discriminant Analysis Country Groupings (contd.)
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Governance Measures Standardized t Sig R Square
Coefficient adjusted
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Discriminant Country Groups 4 and 5
Voice and Accountability
Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.497 3.531 0.001 0.227
Political Stability
Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.346 2.273 0.029 0.097
Government Effectiveness
Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.770 8.628 0.000
Entrepreneurship 0.256 2.872 0.007 0.695
Regulatory Quality
Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.613 5.364 0.000
Entrepreneurship 0.312 2.733 0.010 0.499
Rule of Law
Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.752 7.795 0.000
Entrepreneurship 0.224 2.319 0.026 0.643
Control of Corruption
Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.722 7.069 0.000
Entrepreneurship 0.233 2.282 0.028 0.600
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Stepwise Regression --  Dependent Variables Listed in order of Entry. Data: Governance measures
World Bank Governance Indicators; Entrepreneurship: World Bank, Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES), 2020
All data is for 2009.
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countries in Groups 3 and 4. With a 15% higher increase in entrepre-
neurship between Groups 3 and 4 than that observed with the WEF
countries, entrepreneurship continues to play a significant role in the up-
grading of governance for countries reaching stages 4 and 5. 
From these results, one can tentatively conclude that successful
movement through higher stages of development has been associated with
entrepreneurial gains resulting in subsequent improvements in governance,
as seen in the virtuous circle pattern of successful reform-led growth.
Entrepreneurship, Governance, and the Shadow Economy
One of the main impediments to competiveness and sustained growth is
the development of a large shadow, or informal, economy. Numerous
studies have documented that, while the shadow economy may provide a
temporary haven for the unemployed, its low level of productivity and tax
Table 15
Entrepreneurial Activity by Country Grouping
______________________________________________________________________
Country __________________________________________
Grouping Discriminant WEF 
Country Grouping Country Grouping
______________________________________________________________________
Group 1 0.404 0.472
Group 2 0.993 0.990
(% difference) 59.32 52.32
Group 3 2.036 2.374
(% difference) 51.23 58.30
Group 4 3.736 3.417
(% difference) 45.50 30.52
Group5 6.267 5.948
(% difference) 40.39 42.55
_______________________________________________________________________
Notes:World Bank: The 2020 World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Snapshots (WBGES).
World Bank Entrepreneurship Data Set: Number of newly registered limited
liablility firms per 1,000 working-age population (those of ages 15-64)
for the year 2009
Entrepreneurship
potential ultimately causes a drag on sustained rates of economic growth.61
Furthermore, the development of a large shadow economy is usually one
of the symptoms of the vicious circle noted above. Often with the
development of a large shadow economy, insurgent and criminal groups
are able to establish secure sources of financing for their operations, further
contributing to on-going instability and economic decline.62
As might be expected, the size of the shadow economy declines as
countries pass through the various stages of development, although this
reduction appears to stall at around 35% of GDP at the Group 3 level
before declining rapidly to 15.25% as countries reach Group 4. While the
shadow economy contracts as entrepreneurial activity increases, it does so
at a differential rate. Recent estimates place Pakistan’s shadow economy at
about 37 percent of the country’s GDP,63 which is somewhat lower than the
40.45% mean for Group 1 countries (Table 16). 
To test whether the reduction in the shadow economy is a direct result of
increased entrepreneurship or of a more indirect process stemming from the
improved governance associated with increased entrepreneurial activity,
regressions were undertaken beginning with Group 1 and gradually
expanding the Group sample size. For these countries (Table 17), improved
goods market efficiency was the strongest factor reducing the size of the
shadow economy, followed by innovation (a key element affecting the
expansion of entrepreneurship for this group of countries) and fiscal freedom.
The last term is logical since higher tax rates at early stages of development
have been known to force many firms into informal (tax-avoidance) activities.
These three variables account for over 80% of the variance in the size of the
shadow economies across this group of countries. Beyond these variables,
entrepreneurship was not statistically significant in contributing to the
regression equation. The model predicted the size of Pakistan’s shadow
economy to be 37.5%—quite close to its actual value of 37.1%
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61See for example, Robert Looney, “The Economic Consequences of Conflict: The Rise
of Iraq’s Informal Economy”, Journal of Economic Issues, December 2006; Robert Looney,
“Iraq’s Shadow Economy,” Revista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commercialli,
December 2005.
62Robert Looney, “The Business of Insurgency: The Expansion of Iraq’s Shadow
Economy, The National Interest, Fall 2005
63This figure along with those for our sample of countries are taken from Andreas Buehn
and Friedrich Schneider, Shadow Economies and Corruption All Over the World: Revised
Estimates for 120 Countries, Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal,
October 27, 2009
Expanding the sample to include Group 2 countries produced a shift in
factors affecting the size of the shadow economy. Now innovation becomes
the most important variable, followed by investment freedom. Regulatory
quality is marginally significant and positive sign, i.e., it increases the size
of the shadow economy. Improved regulatory quality at this stage of
development may force firms that are unable to comply into the shadow
economy. Finally, expanding the sample to include Group 4 and 5
countries (Table 18) resulted in the rule of law playing the dominant role in
the shadow economy’s reduction.
The results for the shadow economy are roughly consistent with the
entrepreneur-led virtuous circle described above and, in that sense, close
the circle. For Group 1 countries, economic reforms, especially in the areas
of trade and improved business freedom, jump-start entrepreneurial
activity (Table 6). As entrepreneurial activity takes hold, this class begins to
generate more resources for growth and supportive government services.
With growth, political stability becomes easier to maintain (Table 9). For
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Table 16





Group 1 40.56 0.472
Group 2 35.54 0.990
(% difference) -14.12 52.32
Group 3 35.1 2.374
(% difference) -1.25 58.30
Group 4 27.86 3.417
(% difference) -25.99 30.52
Group5 15.25 5.948
(% difference) -82.69 42.55
____________________________________________________________________
Notes: Entrepreneurship: The 2020 World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Snapshots
(WBGES)  Data Set -- Newly registered limited liability firms per 1,000 working age 
population. Shadow Economy (% GDP) from Andreas Buehn and Friedrich Schneider, 
Shadow Economies and Corruption All Over the World: Revised Estimates for 120 
Countries, Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 
27-Oct-09
WEF Country Grouping
successful countries that are able to continue moving up the development
scale, further growth and expansion in entrepreneurial activities result in
the broad improvements in governance required for sustained growth.
These patterns occur in WEF Groups 3 and 4, with subsequent dramatic
declines in the size of the shadow economy in Groups 4 and 5.
Entrepreneurial Development and the New Growth Framework
An extensive quantitative analysis of the growth patterns of successful
countries suggests that entrepreneurial-led development, which forms the
foundation for Pakistan’s New Growth Framework is a promising
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Table 17
Determinants of the Shadow Economy
(Stepwise Regression)
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________





WEF Goods Market Efficiency -0.816 -5.099 0.000 13 0.816 0.667 0.641
Model 2
WEF Goods Market Efficiency -0.553 -3.637 0.003
WEF Innovation -0.464 -3.054 0.010 12 0.901 0.812 0.781
Model 3
WEF Goods Market Efficiency -0.547 -4.151 0.002
WEF Innovation -0.673 -4.155 0.002
EF Fiscal Freedom -0.317 -2.222 0.048 11 0.933 0.871 0.835
Pakistan Actual = 37.1% Predicted = 37.5%
WEF Groups 1 and 2
 
Model 1
WEF Innovation -0.638 -3.970 0.001 23 0.638 0.407 0.381
Model 2
WEF Innovation -0.679 -4.494 0.000
EF Monetary Freedom -0.318 -2.105 0.047 22 0.711 0.506 0.461
Pakistan Actual = 37.1% Predicted = 39.6%
WEF Groups 1 2 and 3
Model 1
WEF Innovation -0.449 -3.255 0.002 42 0.449 0.201 0.182
Model 2
WEF Innovation -0.521 -3.802 0.000
EF Invedstment Freedom -0.287 -2.099 0.042 41 0.528 0.279 0.244
Model 3
WEF Innovation -0.671 -4.478 0.000
EF Investment Freedom -0.623 -3.009 0.005
WB Regulatory Quality 0.426 2.099 0.042 40 0.592 0.350 0.302
Pakistan Actual = 37.1% Predicted = 42.7%
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: Stepwise Regression Model: IBM SPSS 19.0; Country groupings are those formed from a discriminant analysis of the  combined
data set. Data Set: WEF = World Economic Forum Dompetitiveness data set;, EF = Heritage Economic Freedom Data Set; 
WB = World Bank Governance Indicators data set. 
Entrepreneurship data: World Bank Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES) 2010.
Regression Analysis was the size of the shadow economy (%GDP) on the combined WEF, WB and EF data sets.
Additional Variable: WEFGROUP,  WEF Grouping from the WEF's 2010-2011 Competitiveness Report
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alternative. The analysis found that entrepreneurial activity was a key
element driving the growth process through progressive stages of economic
development. Successful countries that followed an entrepreneurial-led
strategy, such as the Czech Republic and Poland, sustained their growth
through a series of ongoing economic and governance reforms initiated by
this growing stakeholder group. The result was the creation of a virtuous
circle in which increased economic liberalization led to expanded entrepre-
neurship, increased growth, and improved governance, which in turn led
to further growth and development (Figure 14).
According to the World Bank’s Business in Pakistan Report: 
There is no blueprint for how to grow and prosper in a challenging environment, but
one factor is creating an investment climate conducive to starting and running a busi-
ness, where complying with regulations brings more benefits than costs, and where an
entrepreneur with an innovative idea can test the waters and succeed or fail. Where
commercial regulations are simple, efficient and accessible to all, entrepreneurs can
focus on what they do best—running their businesses. This is important for Pakistan
Table 18
Determinants of the Shadow Economy (contd.)
(Stepwise Regression)
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Standardized t Sig df R R Square Adjusted
Coefficient R Square
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
WEF Groups 1, 2, 3 and 4
Model 1
WB Rule of Law -0.517 -4.315 0.000 51 0.517 0.267 0.253
Model 2
WB Rule of Law -0.505 -4.363 0.000
WEF Market Size -0.254 -2.195 0.333 50 0.576 0.332 0.305
Pakistan Actual = 37.1% Predicted = 42.0%
WEF Groups 2, 3 and 4
Model 1
WB Rule of Law -0.503 -3.429 0.001 36 0.503 0.253 0.232
WEF Groups 3, 4 and 5
Model 1
WB Rule of Law -0.804 -9.835 0.000 53 0.804 0.646 0.639
Model 2
WB Rule of Law -0.793 -10.041
WEF Market Size -0.176 -2.231 54 0.823 0.677 0.665
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: Stepwise Regression Model: IBM SPSS 19.0; Country groupings are those formed from a discriminant analysis of the  combined
data set. Data Set: WEF = World Economic Forum Dompetitiveness data set;, EF = Heritage Economic Freedom Data Set; 
WB = World Bank Governance Indicators data set. 
Entrepreneurship data: World Bank Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES) 2010.
Regression Analysis was the size of the shadow economy (%GDP) on the combined WEF, WB and EF data sets.
Additional Variable: WEFGROUP,  WEF Grouping from the WEF's 2010-2011 Competitiveness Report
where small and medium size firms constitute nearly 90% of all enterprises, employ
80% of the nonagricultural labor force and contribute 40% of annual GDP.64
Figure 14. Successful Reforms and Virtuous Circles
Source: Oleh Havrylyshyn and Thomas Wolf, Determinants of Growth in Transition Countries,
Finance & Development, June 1999 
The empirical results support this argument. For Pakistan and other
Group 1 countries, trade liberalization and increased business freedom
have the most simulative effects on entrepreneurship and new firm
creation, out of a wide range of governance, economic freedom and
competitiveness factors. 
Local communities have some degree of control over the rules and
regulations governing business, as illustrated by the wide range of
differences in the ease of doing business between Pakistan’s major cities
(Table 19). However, while business freedom can be addressed at the local
level, trade liberalization lies firmly in the hands of Pakistan’s central
government. According to Heritage House, Pakistan’s level of trade
freedom is below the norm for Group 1 countries, with import restrictions,
inconsistent and burdensome regulations, and corruption adding consid-
erably to the cost of trade.65 Proponents of the New Growth Framework will
need to amass sufficient support and momentum to overcome the many
entrenched groups who currently benefit from these added costs and
restrictions.
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64World Bank, Doing Business in Pakistan 2010 (Washington IBRD, 2010), p.xv
65Heritage House, Economic Opportunity and Prosperity: The 2011 Index of Economic
Freedom (Washington: Heritage House, 2011). 
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Assuming these reforms can be put in place, the discriminate analysis
identified innovation and infrastructure as the most important factors facili-
tating a country’s rise from Group 1 to Group 2. Pakistan scored above
even the Group 2 countries on innovation, which indicates that it has the
makings of a large and dynamic entrepreneurial class. The country lags
significantly, however, in infrastructure. 
In the usual development sequence, the government would take the lead
in addressing this deficiency in order to reduce the costs of entrepreneurial
activities so that their profitability becomes readily apparent.
Unfortunately, Pakistan’s government is notoriously bad at this type of
decision-making and innovation. One advantage of the discriminant
analysis approach is that it suggests ways that countries can make-up for
these types of deficiencies by overcompensating in other areas, in a process
akin to the unbalanced growth strategy originally developed by Albert
Hirschman.66 In Pakistan’s case, the analysis suggests that the entrepre-
neurial class could assume the lead role in a Hirschman-type process. 
Under this scenario, the New Growth Framework would encourage
entrepreneurs to continue and expand their innovative activity. The
entrepreneurs, in turn, would place increased pressure on the government
to provide accommodating infrastructure. As the entrepreneurial class
grew in strength, its influence would help spur a productive public
66Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development, (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1958). 
Table 19
Ease of Doing Business in Pakistan
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Dealing With
Ease of Doing Starting a Construction Registering Paying
Business Business Permits Priperty Taxes
City, Province (rank) (rank) (rank) (rank) (rank)
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Falsalabad, Punjab 1 2 6 1 3
Multan, Punjab 2 6 1 7 3
Lehore, Punjab 3 3 3 4 3
Islamabad, ICT 4 1 8 3 1
Shelkhupura, Punjab 5 9 8 5 3
Gujranwala, Punjab 6 13 2 6 3
Sukkur, Sindh 7 10 4 10 11
Peshawaar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 8 3 6 9 10
Karachi, Sindh 9 3 10 11 11
Rawalpindi, Punjab 10 8 5 7 3
Slalkot, Punjab 11 12 11 1 3
Quetta, Baluchistan 12 6 12 13 2
Hyderbad, Sindh 13 11 13 11 11
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Note: The ease of doing business is calculated as the ranking on the simple average percentile rankings on each of the six topics covered.
The ranking on each topic is the simple average of the percentile rankings on its component indicators.
Source: World Bank, Doing Business in Pakistan, 2010, p.7
investment program to meet specific needs and overcome well-identified
bottlenecks to increased economic activity. Such a public investment
program would extend not only to physical, but to human capital, as the
increasing sophistication of firms combines with trade-induced technology
transfer to expand the demand for skilled workers.
Once growth has been jump-started, entrepreneurial reform efforts must
immediately shift to governance reforms, particularly in the areas of voice
and accountability, to create a virtuous circle that will allow the country to
sustain its growth and continue up the development ladder to Group 2, 3
and beyond, as illustrated in Figure 15.
Figure 15. Blueprint for Pakistani Development
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Economic reforms by Musharraf in the early to mid-2000s were not
followed by improvements in governance and instead gave rise to a new
set of rent-seekers who blocked further reforms, stalling the economic take-
off.67 Eastern European countries, like Belarus and Romania, that were
unsuccessful in completing their transitions from communism followed a
similar pattern and devolved into:
…a vicious circle in which initial steps toward market reform create opportunities for
rent seeking and corruption. Vested interests that benefit from these opportunities very
soon establish themselves and resist further reform steps, such as allowing open entry
to the market, fostering competition, providing for full liberalization, and establishing
a solid rule of law. As a side effect, an underground economy emerges. Limited com-
petition, incomplete liberalization, incentives to go underground, and the uneven rule
of law can freeze the transformation in its tracks. Slow economic progress, a reversal of
growth, and a collapse of financial stabilization can easily result (Figure 16).68
Figure 16. Failed Reforms and Vicious Circles
Source: Oleh Havrylyshyn and Thomas Wolf, Determinants of Growth in Transition Countries,
Finance & Development, June 1999.
The present study has focused on Pakistan, where instability and conflict
are on-going and well-established groups with strong vested interests abound.
Even in such a situation, the results presented above suggest that an entrepre-
neurial-based development strategy is on firm theoretical and empirical
grounds. Over time, the institutional reforms induced by the entrepreneurial
67Robert Looney, “Failed Take-Off: An Assessment of Pakistan’s October 2008 Economic
Crisis, University of Bradford, Pakistan Security Research Unit, Brief Number 46, April 21,
2009, p.7
68Oleh Havrylyshyn and Thomas Wolf, Determinants of Growth in Transition Countries,
Finance & Development, June 1999.
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class would enable the country to overcome existing impediments to
sustained growth and move to higher levels of development.
In summary, the findings presented above suggest that:
1. It is unlikely that in Pakistan’s current institutional/political setting
traditional aid programs, even with greatly expanded funding, could
initiate a process of institutional development and reform sufficient
to offset Pakistan’s current slow growth and cycle of violence.
2. However, an extensive quantitative assessment of successful country
growth patterns found that entrepreneurial activity is a key element
in driving the growth process through progressive stages of
economic development.
3. Successful countries whose development relies on increased
entrepreneurial activity appear to sustain growth through a series of
ongoing reforms initiated by this growing stakeholder group. As a
result, they are able to establish virtuous circles of increased
economic liberalization, extended entrepreneurship, expanded
growth, and improved governance, which lead in turn to further
growth and development.
4. Increased trade liberalization and improvements in the business
climate are the most important factors for stimulating entrepre-
neurial expansion for countries at Pakistan’s stage of development. 
5. Consequently, entrepreneurial efforts could be expanded in the
short-term without major improvements in governance. 
6. Entrepreneurial-led development could potentially create a virtuous
of circle of growth and reform in Pakistan capable of overcoming the
constraints of violence, bureaucratic inertia, and the country’s many
vested interests.
7. In principle, Pakistan’s New Growth Framework incorporates all of
the elements noted above.
